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RESPONSE TO THE l\10RTON ESTATE'S STATEl\ffiNT OF FACTS
Notwithstanding the factual allegations in the Brief of Appellee, three critical
undisputed facts rise above the rest:
1. Nearly three years transpired between the January 25, 2006 wire and the
December 31, 2008 Demand Note.
2. Defendant/Appellant Kraig Higginson (Higginson) 1 purposefully refused to issue
(or deliver) the original Demand Note to Jim Morton (Morton). (R. at 279).
3. Morton never demanded delivery of the original Demand Note. Id.
ARGlTh1ENT

I.

THE lVIORTON ESTATE'S UCC 3 IS OPTIONAL ARGUl\1ENT IS
UNSUPPORTED BY LAW, CONTRARY TO STATUTE AND CASE LAW,
AND CONTRADICTED BY THE lVIORTON ESTATE'S OWN SU1\11\1ARY
JUDGMENT REPRESENTATIONS
The Morton Estate argues that Higginson' s appeal should be dismissed outright

because he appealed only one of two independent alternative grounds from the Trial
Court's summary judgment order. Specifically, the Morton Estate claims that the Trial
Court granted its simple breach of contract claim without considering Article 3 of Utah's
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC 3) and, alternatively, correctly granted its breach of
contract claim even after applying UCC 3. The Morton Estate thus argues that because
Higginson only addressed the latter argument on appeal and ignored the fom1er, his
appeal fails.
1

Although fellow Defendant/Appellant Mark Burdge joins this appeal because the Trial
Court denied the Defendants' summary judgment motion below, Higginson is primarily
referenced in this appeal because the Trial Court entered a money judgment only against
him. (R. 450-52).
1
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This argument, hmvever, is premised on the non-applicability of UCC 3. In other
words, the Morton Estate argues application ofUCC 3 to negotiable instruments (such as
the Demai1d Note) is optional, and the Trial Court coITectly disregarded UCC 3 ,,rhen it
a"\\rarded the :Morton Estate summary judgment on its simple breach of contract claim.

A.

The :Morton Estate Cites No Legal Authority For Its UCC 3 Is Optional
Argument

Nowhere in the Brief of Appellee did the 1\1orton Estate cite any legal support for
its UCC 3 is optional argument. Nor does the Morton Estate quote any statute or
secondary source stating that a judge can disregard UCC 3 ·when adjudicating an alleged
breach of a negotiable instrument.
Instead, the 1\1orton Estate relies solely on Simmons . Media G,p., LLC v. fiVaykar,
LLC, 2014 UT App 145, 335 P.3d 885, for the proposition that an appellate court ,vill not

reverse a trial court ruling that rests on independent alte1native grounds where only one
of those grounds is challenged on appeal. Simmons ~Media, however, did not involve a
promissory note or UCC 3. Rather, it involved a breach of a conunercial lease. Id. at if6.
Further, the Simmons _Media court found multiple breaches of the commercial lease, yet
the defendant addressed only one of the breaches on appeal. Id. at if33 (""\Vaykar
challenges only one of the district court's alternative grounds for its ruling. The distJ.ict
court ruled that the right of first refusal was breached in 2005 when Karen sold \Vaykar,
LLC to Hopper Holdings. But the district court also mled that "\Vaykar breached the right
of first refusal in 2002 ... "). Based on these facts, Simmons Media is inapplicable to the
present case.

2
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B.

The Law in Utah and Other States Hold That UCC 3 Applies to
Negotiable Instruments

There is a reason the Morton Estate's UCC 3 is optional claim enjoys no legal
support. Statutes and case law from Utah and other jurisdictions clearly and
overwhelmingly hold that UCC 3 is not optional, but rather applies to negotiable
instruments such as the Demand Note.
First, U.C.A. § 70A-3-102(1) simply and clearly states UCC 3 "applies to
negotiable instruments." Note Sh to U.C.A. § 70A-9a-102 states, "As a general matter,
Article 3, and not Article 9, governs obligations on negotiable instruments." Similarly,
the Colorado Supreme Court has stated, "Article 3 of the UCC governs the issuance,
transfer, enforcement, and discharge of negotiable instruments." Liberty A1ortg. Co,p. v.

Fiscus, 379 P.3d 278,281 (Colo. 2016). The Third Circuit also explained, "The U.C.C.
contains comprehensive provisions regulating negotiable instruments." Mackin Eng'g Co.
v. Am. Exp. Co., 437 F.App'x 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

Second, UCC 3 defines a "negotiable instrument" as an unconditional promise to
pay a fixed amount of money. U.C.A. § 70A-3-104(1). The Demand Note fits within this
definition. By contrast, an instrument that conspicuously states it is not negotiable "is not
an instrument governed by this chapter." U.C.A. § 70A-3-104(4). The Demand Note
contains no such statement.
Third, the Morton Estate's UCC 3 is optional claim contradicts UCC 3, which
states principles oflaw and equity "supplement" the provisions ofUCC 3. See, U.C.A. §
70A-la-103(2) ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this title, the principles

3
~
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of law and equity, including the law mercha..11t and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent ... and other Yalidating or invalidating cause supplement its

proYisions.'} Based on t.1us, the Morton Estate's Yiev,,. ti.11at the Trial Court was correct in
disregarding UCC 3 provisions is inc01Tect.
Finally~ U.C.A. § 70A-3-305(1) directly disposes the :Morton Estate's claim that it
can pursue a simple contract claim regardless ofUCC 3:
(1) the right to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument is subject to
the follo,,,ing:

***
(b) a defense of the obligor stated in another section of this chapter or a
defense of the obligor that would be a,·ailable if the person entitled to enforce
the instrument ·were e1forci11g a right to payment under a simple contract;

(Emphasis added). Thus, the M01ion Estate cannot conveniently ignore UCC 3 by
treating the Demand Note as a "simple contract.'' Section 305(1) expressly allov{S
Higginson to raise UCC 3 defenses to the Morton Estate's contract claim.

C.

Throughout Its Summary Judgment Briefing, the l\'.Iorton Estate
Consistently Acknowledged That UCC 3 Governs and Applies to the
Demand Note

The Morton Estate's claim that the UCC 3 is optional contradicts representations
made throughout its summary judgment briefing that UCC 3 applied to and governed the
Demand Note. For example, the Morton Estate stated:
•

"Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC'~), the relevant statutes of
limitations~ and the principles of equity all provide for recovery by the Estate." (R.
at 211).

•

"As recognized by Defendants, the Court is guided by UCC Article 3 in analyzing
issues related to the Demand Note." (R. at 217).

4
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•

"Under UCC 3, presentment of an instrument is excused if the 'person entitled to
present the instrument cannot with reasonable diligence make presentment.'" Id.
(Citation omitted).

•

"By contrast, and as Defendants recognize, the Demand Note is a negotiable
instrument governed by UCC 3." (R. at 215-16).

•

"Because the Demand Note is a negotiable instrument, it is governed by UCC 3 ."
(R. at 216).

•

"Thus, Higginson's argument that he received $500,000 from Morton, promised to
repay, executed a demand Note, and sent a scanned copy ... should not be taken
as a valid escape from his obligation under the UCC." (R. at 298-99).

Thus, the Morton Estate litigated the case below under the correct assumption that UCC 3
applies to and governs enforcement of the Demand Note. Nowhere in its summary
judgment briefing did the Morton Estate claim application of UCC 3 was optional, or that
the legal requirements of a simple contract cause of action exist beyond the reach of DCC
3 when the simple contract in question is a negotiable instrument.
Based on the foregoing, the Morton Estate cannot seriously claim the Trial Court
correctly granted its breach of contract claim on summary judgment without first
applying DCC 3. To the extent the Trial Court concluded in its sumn1ary judgment order
that application ofUCC 3 was optional, the summary judgment order errs as a matter of
law and should be vacated. See, Canyon Meadows Home Ov.mers Ass'n v. Wasatch Cty.,

2001 UT App 414, ,18, 40 P .3d 1148 ("In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this
court accords no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law; the trial court's
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.").

5
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II.

THE l\10RTON ESTATE'S ALTE~T\TATIVE EQUITABLE CAUSES OF
ACTION ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS A.i~D,
ALTERNATIVELY, FAIL BASED ON DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT
The :Morton Estate next asks t.½e Court to do sua sponte \,·hat the Trial Court

declined to do - rule in favor of the 110110n Estate as a matter of la\\7 on its equitable
causes of action (promissory estoppel and unjust enriclm1ent), and find no disputed issues
of fact in the process.~ The 11011011 Estate's request is a forlorn hope.

A.

The l\1orton Estate's Legal Support For This Argument Is Inapplicable

The Morton Estate~ s legal suppmi for requesting this Court to enter summary
judgment in its favor on alternative equitable grounds is unavailing. The Morton Estate
relies solely on Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ,-f2, 52 P .3d 1158, which pertains to an
order of protection adjudicated at a bench trial and not on summary judgment. Further,
the Bailey cowi expressly prohibited courts of appeal from finding new facts or
re,,1eighing evidence. Id. at ,I20 ("The com1 of appeals is limited to the findings of fact
made by the trial cowi and may not find new facts or reweigh the evidence in light of the
new legal theory or alternate ground.'} Thus, even if this Court wants to rule on an
alternative ground, it can only do so with facts found by the Trial Court. The Trial Comi,
however, found only six enumerated facts in its summary judgment order, none of which
address the elements of unjust emichment or promissory estoppel. (R. at 383). Because
Bailey prevents this Court from weighing evidence and finding new facts, this Court

cannot adjudicate the merits of the J\1orton Estate's alternative equitable claims.
2

The Trial Court expressly refused to rule on both equitable causes of action, stating "the
Court does not need to reach those claims on their merits and deems them :MOOT." (R. at
384).
6
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B.

The Equitable Claims Are Barred by the Statute of Limitations

The Court need not weigh evidence because the Morton Estate's equitable claims
are time-barred. The Morton Estate argues its equitable claims survive the statute of
limitations because they did not "begin running" until "Higginson refused to pay," which
occurred when "Higginson denied the demand for payment" contained in a September 5,
2014 letter to Higginson from the Morton Estate's lawyers. See, Brief of Appellee, 3, 18-

19. The Morton Estate thus argues the statute of limitations began to run on September 5,
2014.
According to the Morton Estate's logic, the date the alleged unjust enriclm1ent
occurred or the date a person detrimentally relies on another's promise is irrelevant.
Rather, it is when that injured person sends a letter demanding compensation for the
alleged unjust enrichment or compensation for the alleged broken promise that triggers
the running of the statute oflimitations. Stated differently, a person can wait years and
years after an enrichment or a failed promise, send a letter demanding payment, and when
that demand is ignored the person can file a lawsuit, thereby circumventing the statute of
limitations. Such reasoning would eviscerate statutes of limitations.

1.

The Morton Estate's Unjust Enrichment Claim Became TimeBarred No Later Than December 31, 2008

Fortunately, the law is clear when the statute of limitations begins to run. A cause
of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins running on the happening of the last
event necessary to complete the cause of action. Spears v. Tflarr, 2002 UT 24, 133, 44
P.3d 742. The elements required to prove unjust emi.chment are "(I) a benefit conferred

7
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on one person by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the
benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit ,:vithout
payment of its value.'~ American To·wers Ovm.ers v. CCI _Mechanical, 930 P.2d 1182,
1192 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). The four-year statute of limitations for unjust
enriclu11ent, U.C.A. § 78B-2-307(3\ began running once these three elements accrued.
:Morton confe1Ted a benefit on Higginson on January 25, 2006 ,:vhen 1vforton wired
the money to Higginson. Higginson would have had k11owledge of the wfre upon
receiving it (indeed, even though Higginson signed the Demand Note on December 31,
2008, the Demand Note was back-dated to January 24, 2006). 3 As for the third element of
this claim, according to the Morton Estate's theory, Higginson promised to repay the
money from the date he first received it. The only other scenario is that Higginson was
not obligated to repay the money until he ignored the September 5, 2014 lawyer letter.
Other than the date of the la~)'er letter, the M01ton Estate posits no other date by which it
supposedly became inequitable for Higginson to retain the benefit of the money without
payment of its value.
Thus, the triggering date for the unjust enrichment statute of li.J.nitations had to be
January 25, 2006 (date of the wire) or, at the very latest, December 31, 2008 (date of the
Demand Note). Either date results in the running of the four-year statute oflimitations
well before the October 10, 2014 Complaint.

3

Although the Demand Note is back-dated to January 24, 2006, the wire was actually
sent on January 25, 2006. (R. at 173).
8
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2.

The l\1orton Estate's Promissory Estoppel Claim Became TimeBarred No Later Than December 31, 2008

The Morton Estate's promissory estoppel claim fares no better than its unjust
emichment claim. The elements of promissory estoppel are ( 1) the plaintiff acted in
reasonable reliance on a promise made by the defendant; (2) the defendant lmew that the
plaintiff had relied on the promise; (3) the defendant was aware of all material facts; and
(4) the plaintiff relied on the promise resulting in a loss to the plaintiff. ~Nunley v.
TYestates Casing Services, Inc., 1999 UT 100, ,I35, 989 P.2d 1077 (citations omitted).

Any alleged promise to repay would logically have been made prior to the date
Morton wired the money to Higginson (January 25, 2006). Other than the December 31,
2008 date of the Demand Note, the Morton Estate presents no other date by which
Higginson supposedly promised to repay Morton. Elements (1) and (2) of this claim thus
allegedly had to occur at the latest by December 31, 2008. Regarding element (3), the
Morton Estate points to no material fact that Higginson (the defendant) was not aware of
at the time he received money from Morton, so this element supposedly occurred no later
vJ

than December 31, 2008. Finally, the reliance by and loss to Morton/the Morton Estate
(element (4)) also supposedly occurred on January 25, 2006, but no later than December
31, 2008. Logically, Morton would not rely on any supposed representation from
Higginson after he wired money to Higginson. Any reliance by Morton had to have
occmTed prior to the wire date. The only "loss" in this whole dispute is the supposed
"loss" by Morton of his money. Yet, the Morton Estate claims the date of "loss" was
9
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,\,.hen Higgh1son refused to pay in response to the la\7\"yer letter. If so, such a reading of
the date of a plaintiffs "loss" would render statutes of limitations meaningless because a
plaintiff can wait years and years, and then decide to hire a lawyer ,:vho sends a demand~
and only then if the defendant rejects the demand is the statute of limitations triggered.
No doubt such an interpretation would be a boon to plaintiffs every,,rhere, but such 'Would
render the statutes of limitations meaningless.
Because the four elements for promissory estoppel ,J;.rould have supposedly
occurred at the time of the wire (January 25, 2006)~ or no later than the date of the
Demand Note (December 31, 2008), the Morton Estate's promissory estoppel claim is
time-barred based on the four-year statute oflimitations in U.C.A. § 78B-2-307(3).

3.

The l\1orton Estate's Reliance on the Equitable Tolling Rule Is
\Vithout l\1erit

As a hedge against its illogical and meritless objections to the applicable statutes
of limitation, the Morton Estate invokes the equitable tolling rule - i.e. Higginson
supposedly strung the Morton Estate along by ignoring its demands until the time to sue
ran out; thus, the Morton Estate invokes the equitable tolling rule.
The fatal defect with this claim is that the Morton Estate.first communicated with
Higginson via email on January 28: 2013 - a month after the statute of limitations had
already expired. Specifically,~ 12 of the Statement of Facts in the Brief of Appellee
states, ';On January 28, 2013, Megan (Morton) Moss ("Megan") sent an email to
Higginson ... and asked to talk to Higginson about the Demand Note." However, the
statute of limitations on the two equitable claims started running at the very latest on
10
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December 31, 2008 and expired four years later on December 31, 2012- approximately
one month before Megan sent Higginson her first email demanding payment on the
Demand Note. Thus, based on the late timing of Megan's first email to Higginson, the
Court need not even decide the merits of the Morton Estate's equitable tolling claim.
The only way the equitable tolling rule comes into play is if the Court agrees with
the Morton Estate's logic that the September 5, 2014 lawyer letter triggered the statute of
limitations. In such a case, there is still no need to apply the equitable tolling rule because
the Morton Estate would have timely filed its complaint anyway.
Even if the Court decides to entertain the equitable tolling rule (which the Trial
Court side-stepped as moot), the rule is nevertheless without merit. "[B]efore a statute of
limitations may be tolled under [the equitable tolling rule], the plaintiff must make an
initial showing that he did not know nor should have reasonably known the facts

underlying the cause of action in time to reasonably comply with the limitations period."
Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87,123,223 P.3d 1128 (emphasis added). The Morton
Estate's sole allegation in support of this rule is that Higginson "strung" Megan along
despite having "confirmed his obligation to Morton (while he was alive)," which
somehow constitutes concealing or misleading conduct under the equitable tolling rule.
Brief of Appellee, 19. Even assuming these allegations are true, they are inelevant to "the
facts underlying the causes of action" because those underlying facts would have already
occurred before Megan's first email to Higginson. In other words, stringing Megan along
would not have affected the "facts underlying the cause of action."
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4.

The l\1orton Estate's Remaining Non-Equitable Causes of
Action Are Also Time-Barred

In the Brief of Appellants, Higginson argued that the !\1mton Estate's remaining
claims of conversion, fraud, and tortious interference are all time-barred. In response, the
M01ton Estate made no effort to save these claims from the statute of limitations other
than a passing reference in footnote 9 of the Brief of Appellee.
Because these remairiing claims are triggered upon the Morton Estate's "loss" or
"injury" (according to footnote 9 in the Brief of Appellee), the starting date for the statute
of limitations on these claims ,;vas either the January 25, 2006 wire or, at the latest, the
December 31, 2008 Demand Note. Other than its September 5, 2014 lawyer letter, the
Morton Estate identifies no other possible date of supposed loss or injury. The :Morton
Estate's non-equitable claims are thus time-barred.

C.

Alternatively, the Equitable Claims Fail Because of Disputed Issues of
Fact

In the alternative, if the Court is unpersuaded with the previous arguments, it
should nonetheless deny the :Morton Estate's request that it adjudicate the tvvo equitable
claims on appeal because equity necessarily requires a balancing of facts resulting in a
trier of fact's subjective detennination of which side is more entitled to equity. As such~
equitable claims like promissory estoppel and unjust emiclunent inherently create factual
disputes requiring the weighing of evidence.
In the present case, the Morton Estate would have this Court rule, as a matter of
law on summary judgment, that Higginson made a representation to Morton, upon \\'hich
12
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Morton allegedly relied to his supposed detriment. Yet, disputed issues of fact abound as
to each element of this claim. As indicated in the Brief of Appellants, Higginson
represented to Morton that he would repay the money in question if, and only if,
Higginson was able to sell his Razer stock and thereby recoup a significant amount of
money. (R. at 277-78 (,Il2); 279 (~17)). The Mmion Estate, of course, disputes this
conditional representation, but in doing so it creates a disputed issue of fact. Similarly,

va

the Morton Estate claims Morton relied on Higginson's supposed promise to repay the
money in question. However, Higginson has testified that Morton was so thrilled at the
five to ten million dollar windfall he received from Higginson' s gifted Razer stock that he
was more than happy to provide Higginson a financial favor. (R. at 277 (,IIO)). To the
extent the Morton Estate disputes these competing facts it creates another disputed issue
of fact, requiring this Court to weigh evidence, which it cannot do based on the summary
judgment standard.

An analysis of the competing facts relative to the Morton Estate's unjust
enrichment cause of action yields the same result. \Vhether Morton confe1Ted a benefit on
Higginson or was simply repaying a favor previously received creates a disputed issue of
i.tjp

fact. Likewise, whether the circumstances make it inequitable for Higginson to retain the
benefit received from Mmion requires the Comi to weigh equities and make a factual
determination, which it cannot do on sunnnary judgment.
Thus, the Morton Estate's request that this Court rule, as a matter of law, in favor
of the Morton Estate on these two alternative equitable claims is without merit and should
be denied.
13
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III.

THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO HIGGINSON'S
EVIDENCE
The Morton Estate claims the parol evidence rule bars consideration of evidence

supporting Higginson's non-issuance and conditional delivery defenses. The Morton
Estate cites Tangren Family Tr. v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326, in support of this
claim. Tangren Family Tr. recites the parol evidence rule as follows:
the mle operates, in the absence of fraud or other invalidating causes, to exclude
evidence of contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered
for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract.

Id. at ,r11 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Tangren Family Tr. court provided
examples of "other invalidating causes" that are exceptions to the parol evidence rule:
,Ve have held that extrinsic evidence is appropriately considered, even in the face
of a clear integration clause, where the contract is alleged to be a forgery, a joke, a
sham, lacking in consideration, or where a contract is voidable for fraud, duress,
mistake, or illegality.

Id. at ,r15 (citation omitted). Higginson relies on tvvo invalidating causes which exempt
his evidence from the parol evidence rule. The first is the statutory defense found in UCC

3:
An unissued instrument ... is binding on the maker or drawer, but non.issuance is
a defense. An instrument that is condition.ally issued or is issued for a special
pwpose is binding on the maker or drm,ver, but failure of the condition or special
pwpose to be fulfilled is a defense.
U.C.A. § 70A-3-105(2) (emphasis added). As explained in bis Brief of Appellants,
Higginson issued the Demand Note for a special purpose -to wit, to accommodate
Morton's accountant's request for documentation regarding M01ion's tax issues. Thus,
Higginson did not issue the Demand Note "for the purpose of giving effect thereto,"
14
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Johnson v. Beickey, 228 P. 189, 191 (Utah 1924), but rather provided a copy of it to his
trusted attorney, Morton, as a non-binding favor. As such, the Demand Note also
qualifies under the "sham" invalidating cause referenced above in Tangren Family Tr.
Relying solely on the parol evidence rule below, the l\1orton Estate asserted no
contradictory facts in response to these two invalidating causes. \\'hether viewed under
the special purpose exception or as a sham, these invalidating causes entitle Higginson to
~

summary judgment on the Morton Estate's breach of contract claim.
A statutory invalidating cause to the parol evidence rule was similarly found in

Stewart v. Bova, 2011 UT App 129, if 18,256 P.3d 230:
Noncompliance with section 78B-3--421 is just such an invalidating cause. Ms.
Stewart alleges that Dr. Bova and his staff did not comply with the requirements
of the statute. Compliance with statutory requirements is essential for a medical
malpractice arbitration agreement to be "validly executed." Utah Code Ann. §
78B-3--421(1) (2008). Thus, Ms. Stewart is not attempting to vary or add to the
terms of the Agreement, but to demonstrate that it was not validly executed, just as
if she had alleged that the Agreement was "voidable for fraud, mistake, or
illegality." Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ,I 15, 182 P.3d 326. Accordingly, her testimony
is not excluded by the parol evidence rule.
Just as U.C.A. § 78B-3-421 (referenced in Stewart) imposed statutory requirements that
trump the parol evidence rule, UCC 3 has the same affect in the present case. See also,

Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. State Tax Conunission, 73 P.2d 974 (Utah 1937) ("For income
tax purposes, under the terms of the statute, the profit or loss of the transaction could not
become on accurate reflection of the assets ... (section 80-14-12, supra) until the sugar

company had ,net the condition precedent imposed by the realty c01poration 's
condition.al acceptance." (Emphasis added)). In other words, general c01mnon law
principles such as the parol evidence 1ule do not prevent courts from considering parol
15
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~

evidence to ensure compliance \\rith statutory requirements. See, Bilanzich v. Lonetti,
2007 UT 26~ ~16, n.6, 160 P.3d 1041 (ruling that Utah Courts "have long held that where
a conflict arises between the common la,v and a statute ... the co nu.non la,v must yield.")
A case remarkably similar to the present case is Hanson v. Greenleaf 218 P. 969
(Utah 1923), a case v.rhich figures prominently in the B1ief of Appellants, but \\7hich is
nowhere rebutted in the Brief of Appellee. In Han.son, the plaintiff sought judgment
against the defendant based on a promissory note even though the "note was necessary to
[plaintiff] as a matter of routine busiiiess, merely to show the amount of the purchase
price for which the stock had been issued .. .~'Id.at 970. In exchange for the note, the
plaintiff had given the defendant stock and promised a w1itten contract governing their
transaction. Id. The plaintiff never provided the promised contract, so the defendant
returned the stock to the plaintiff, demanded the plaintiff return the note, and when the
plaintiff kept the note the defendant repudiated it. Id. Regarding admitting evidence of
the plaintiffs oral promise to provide a ,vritten contract to defendant, the Hanson court
held that oral testimony is:
pemussible in an action between the original pa1ties upon a pronussory note to
defend for ... delivery with a condition precedent without the perfon11ance of
which the note never became a binding and fixed obligation. These defenses are
pemussible, not as varying or contradicting the terms of a \Vritten instrument: but
to establish the fact that no contract bern,een the parties had ever existed.

Id. Relying on the conditional delivery defense authorized by Utah's negotiable
instmments statute ("Comp. La,,;.rs Utah 1917, § 4045"), the Hanson court concluded, "If
these facts so found are supported by the evidence, then there was a conditional delivery
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of the note and it did not become a binding obligation unless and until such conditions
were performed." Id. at 971.
The cases the Morton Estate cites in suppmi of the parol evidence rule do not
adjudicate such statutory invalidating causes, and thus are inapplicable. In Young Living

Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 2011 UT 64, ~,Il-5, 266 P.3d 814, the defendant asse1ied the
common law covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the basis for avoiding the parol
v!j)

evidence rule. InkfediaNews Grp., Inc. v. _McCarthey, 432 F. Supp.2d 1213, 1227 (D.
Utah 2006), the defendants attempted to avoid application of the parol evidence mle by
arguing they were not parties to the integrated contract. In Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v.

Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 750 (Utah 1983), the defendant also asserted a non-statutory
exception to the parol evidence mle. In response, the Bushnell Real Estate cowi
concluded, "The defendants allege only their subjective and uncommunicated intent that
payment be conditional ... Under these circumstances, it is not necessary to refer to the
parol evidence rule."
Thus, the defendants in Tangren Family Tr., Young Living, lvfediaNews G,p, and

Bushnell Real Estate asserted no statutory exception to the parol evidence rule, whereas
the defendants in Hanson, Stewart, Utah-Idaho Sugar, and the present case did.
IV.

HIGGINSON'S UCC 3 DEFENSES ARE PRESERVED, VALID, AND
FATAL TO THE lVIORTON ESTATE'S EFFORT TO ENFORCE THE
DE1\1AND NOTE

In response to Higginson's UCC 3 non-issuance argument, the Mmion Estate
asserts four objections: (A) Higginson failed to preserve the non-issuance argument,
whlch is otherwise imn1aterial and contrary to law; (B) Higginson failed to preserve his
17
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conditions-precedent argument, which is othenvise contrary to law; (C) Higginson failed
to preserve his mutual mistake argument, ,:vhich is not supported factually; and (D)
Higginson's presentment argument is ·"vithout merit. The M01ion Estate is vv-rong on each
of these objections.
A.

Higginson Preserved His Non-Issuance Argument, ,vwch is Highly
Relevant and Legally Supported

The 1\1orton Estate challenges Higginson~s U.C.A. § 70A-3-105 non-issuance
argument by claiming Higginson failed to preserve it below. Curiously, the :M011on Estate
prefaced th.is argument by acknm\,.ledgL.1g that Higginson argued belm\' that non-issuance
"made the instrument invalid under the UCC," and the :Morton Estate argued
"constructive issuance" in response. See, Brief of Appellee, 12. The Morton Estate now
argues because Higginson never mentioned the word "intenf' in conjunction with this
argument, he failed to preserve it. Id. The :Morton Estate's hair-splitting argument is not
only arbitrary and capricious, but ignores the record belov,,r.
Higginson cited and argued U.C.A. § 70A-3-105 in his Supplemental Opposition
to 1\1mion's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 273). Higginson ftuiher argued nonissuance under Section 105 at length at the November 19, 2015 summary judgment oral
argument before the Trial Com1. The following are a fe\v quotes from that argument from
Higginson' s counsel:
Then a circumstance arose that 1\1r. Morton said I need to have a note for a
specific and special purpose. I need to have an instrument or a document in my
files that if I get audited by the IRS it is not going to show that I have given a gift
and I get taxed on the gift. I need a document to suggest that there is a debt
outstanding so I don't get taxed. nwt ·was the specific purpose for this. Nmv that
pwpose, as it was, would beg the fact that the note wouldn't explain the purpose,
18
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Gki

f.tiP

which was apparently to make a presentation to the IRS. So the parties - so Kraig
agreed to sign the note. (R. at 531, lines 10-19) (Emphasis added).
But we are intending to explain that the pwpose and intent of the parties
was not to treat that instrument as a demand upon which an obligation was
required to be perfom1ed. (R. at 532, lines 2-5) (Emphasis added).
The language of this code [section 105], subsection two, says "an unissued
instrument or an unissued incomplete instrument ... " This was never issued. A
copy was given." ... [t]hat is completed is binding on the maker or drawer[, but]
4
non-issuance is a defense." And then this language is particularly applicable to
your question. "An instrument that is conditionally issued or is issued for a special
purpose as binding on the maker is binding on the maker or drawer. But failure of
the condition or special purpose to be fulfilled is a defense." '\Ve have the right to
demonstrate that this was - that this note was issued on a special - for a special
pwpose and on condition. And that condition was that it would only be paid back
if the stock in (inaudible) was sold, if Kraig's stock in (inaudible) could be sold.
And the particular purpose was not to create a demand note that would be
enforceable on its terms. Rather, to present a document in a file that would show
to the IRS that this was not a gift. (R. at 533, lines 5-22) (Emphasis added).
So we believe, Your Honor, that with respect with the question of parol
evidence, we are entitled, not to add language or change language, but to show the
Court what the parties understood, agreed to, and for which pwpose this note was
put into place. (R. at 534, lines 6-10) (Emphasis added).
Contrary to the Morton Estate's argument that Higginson never used the word "intent" in
the summary judgment proceeding below, as quoted above, his legal counsel actually did
use that word. Further, his legal counsel repeatedly referenced and discussed the parties'
understanding and the purpose of the Demand Note. Thus, the Morton Estate's argument

4

Correct punctuation was added to align this quote with the language in U.C.A. § 70A-3105(2).
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that Higginson failed to preserve his UCC 3 non-issuance defense (or preserve his intent
behind that defense) completely ignores the record below. 5
Further, the :Morton Estate cites Tflohnoutka v. Kelley, 2014 UT App 154,330 P.3d
762, as legal supp01i for this preservation argument. WohnoutkG; is unavailing. The

TYohnoutka court excluded an unpreserved issue because it ,,rould have created a new
legal theory on appeal. Id. at ~8 ("On appeal, '\Vohnoutka takes the evidence introduced
in support of his preserved but unsuccessful contract claim and re,,•eaves the constituent
evidentiary threads into a new legal theory.") As shovm by the oral argument quotes
above, there is nothing ne·w on appeal about Higginson~s UCC 3 non-issuance legal
theory.

B.

Higginson Preserved His Conditions-Precedent Argument, \Vhich is
Legally Supported

Citing FVohnoutka, the Morton Estate argues that Higginson failed to preserve his
conditions-precedent argument below. Specifically, the 1\1orton Estate argues that
although Higginson "referenced an alleged condition related to his Razer stock,"
Higginson failed to also cite legal supp01t, and although Higginson argued below "that
his claim of a collateral agreement created an issue of fact for which he was entitled to a
presumption," Higginson never argued that his collateral agreement was an exception to
the parol evidence mle. See, Brief of Appellee, 14. In other words, the l\1orton Estate
acknowledges that Higginson asserted his collateral agreement claim below, but
5

The Morton Estate's complaint that Higginson "did not provide any case law" when he
argued his UCC 3 non-issuance defense below similarly ignores the record. Although
Higginson may not have cited case law in support of this non-issuance defense, he
repeatedly cited statuto,y law (i.e. U.C.A. § 70A-3-105). (R. at 273).
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complains that Higginson did not assert his collateral agreement in response to the p,u-ol
evidence rule.
In asserting this argument that Higginson never argued a collateral agreement as
an exception to the parol evidence rule, the M01ion Estate forgets that it first argued the
parol evidence rule in its Reply Memorandum in Support of M01ion's Motion for
Summary Judg1nent. (R. at 296-97). Because said reply memorandum was the last
vJJ

briefing submitted relative to the Morton Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Higginson never had a chance to respond in writing to the parol evidence rule. One can
only imagine the Morton Estate's response had Higginson attempted to submit a sur-reply
to address the parole evidence rule.
Further, as indicated in the above quotes from the summary judgment oral
argument, Higginson's counsel did, in fact, argue the collateral agreement in response to
the parol evidence rule, thereby preserving the issue.
Finally, the Morton Estate argues Higginson's conditions-precedent claim violates
the parol evidence rule. Higginson has already addressed this argument above, and shown
it fails to apply to both his non-issuance argument and his conditions-precedent
argument.

C.

Higginson Preserved His lVIistake Argument, ,vhich Is Factually
Supported

The Morton Estate claims that Higginson failed to preserve the mistake exception
to the parol evidence rule. However, as indicated above, Higginson never had a chance to
submit a written response to the parol evidence rule (or any exception to the parol
21
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evidence rule) because the first time t.1-ie Morton Estate raised the rule ~·as in its Reply
Memorandum in Support of Morton's J\1otion for Sununary Judgment. (R. at 296-97).
The M01ion Estate thus unfairly tries to take advantage of the civil procedure rule that
provides it the so-called "final sai' in briefing on its motion.
Further, Higginson need not establish this exception to the parol evidence rule by
clear and convincing evidence because the case never ,,,ent to tiial. Rather, it was decided
on summary judgment, the standard of which is ,vhether a disputed issue of fact exists
relative to this mistake exception.
Clearly, facts support this exception. As Higginson· s counsel stated at oral
argument, the particular purpose of the Demand Note "was not to create a demand note
that would be enforceable on its tenns. Rather, to present a document in a file that would
show to the IRS that this was not a gift." (R. at 533, lines 19-22). The Morton Estate's
effo1is, after Morton's death, to enforce the Demand Note changes Higginson and
Morton's understanding and purpose for the Demand Note into a misconception. Had
Higginson understood that Morton would pass a,vay and his estate would attempt to
enforce the Demand Note, he would never have executed it and given Morton's
accountant a copy. Thus, this defense to the parol evidence rule allO\vs Higginson to
introduce evidence relating to the purpose of the Demand Note and the mistaken facts
and assumptions smTounding its execution. 6

6

The Trial Court did not consider parol evidence based on the integration clause of the
Demand Note. (R. at 384.) However, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove mistake.
See Red Bridge Capital v. Dos Lagos, 2016 UT App 162,116,381 P.3d 1147 (reversing
the district court for finding extrinsic evidence was inadmissible when defendants sought
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D.

The Morton Estate's Objections to the Presentment Argument Are
Without ~1:erit

In response to Higginson's recitation of the two presentment standards (strict
compliance and substantial compliance), the Morton Estate argues it satisfies the
substantial compliance standard because the only reason presentment did not occur is
because Higginson prevented it. Ho- Never, as noted in Brul v. A1idAnierican Bank Trust
1

Co., 820 F. Supp. 1311, 1313 (D. Kansas 1993), failure to turn over original documents
was more than a "de minimus variance," and thus fails to establish substantial compliance
with the presentment requirement. Thus, without more, the M01ton Estate fails to comply
with the substantial compliance standard. If the Morton Estate cannot satisfy the
substantial compliance standard, it cannot satisfy the more stringent strict compliance
standard. Id.
The Morton Estate also argues that the cases relied on by Higginson in support of
this presentment argument all reference agreements that expressly required presentment
of the original document in order to receive funds, but the Demand Note contains no such
express presentment requirement. However, the Morton Estate provides no legal support
that an agreement must contain an express presentment demand in order to effectuate
UCC 3's presentment statute (U.C.A. § ?0A-3-501). The Morton Estate's argument that
an agreement must contain an express presentment requirement in order for the maker to
invoke the statutory presentment requirement thus conveniently creates a rule that does
not otherwise exist and has no legal basis.
to use extrinsic evidence to prove mistake); see also Tangren Family Tr. v. Tangren,
2008 UT 20, «jfl5.
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Finally, the 1\1orton Estate claims Higginson has done something untoward by
,,,ithholding delivery of the Demand Note while complaining that :Morton never
presented the Demand Note to Higginson for pay111ent. Delivery and presentment are flip
sides of the same coin. There is nothing improper or inconsistent arguing lack of
presentment based on non-delivery. The fact remains that because the :Morton Estate is
unable to present the original Demand Note (because Higginson never delivered the
original to :Morton), the Morton Estate's claims based on enforcement of the Demand
Note are invalid.

V.

THE COrRT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S A\VA.RD OF
ATTO~~EY FEES .A.J.1\fD A\VARD HIGGINSON HIS FEES INCURRED ON
THISAPPE".\.L
If this Court reverses the Trial Court's decision, it should also reverse the Trial

Court's award of legal fees to the Morton Estate. Additionally, this Court should award
Higginson the legal fees he incurred on appeal based on the Demand Note's legal fee
prov1s10n.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Comi should reverse the Trial Cowi's award of
sunm1ary judgment in favor of the Morton Estate and denial of summary judgment for
Higginson and Burdge, and award Higginson his legal fees incurred on appeal.
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DATED November 28, 2016.
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY, LLC

Isl Stephen Quesenbeny
Stephen Quesenberry
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
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Motions for Summary Judgment - November 19, 2015

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACQUELYNN D. CARMICHAEL,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 140907046

v.
KRAIG T. HIGGINSON,
Defendant.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARGUMENTS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROYAL I. HANSEN

NOVEMBER 19, 2015
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00516

Motions for Summary Judgment - November 19, 2015

1

APPEARANCES :

2

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

3

Landon A. Allred

4

STOEL RIVES, LLP

5

201 South Main Street, Suite 1100

6

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

7

8

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

9

Evan A. Schmutz

10

DURHAM, JONES

11

3301 North Thanksgiving Way, Suite 400

12

Lehi, UT 84043

&

PINEGAR, PC

13
14
15
16

17

18

20
21
22

THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
801-285-9495 / thackertranscripts@gmail.com
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00517

~

Motions for Summary Judgment - November 19, 2015
3

1

SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH - NOVEMBER 17, 2015

2

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER

3

P ROCEE DI NGS

4
5
~

parties and counsel?

6

MR. ALLRED:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. ALLRED:

9

Landon Allred on behalf of the estate.
Thank you.
My client is Jackie Carmichael. And

Megan Moss couldn't be here because she is set for a baby next

10

week and the doctor told her not to fly. So Megan Moss isn't

11

present.

12

THE COURT:

13

MS. SCHMUTZ:

14
15

\JP

THE COURT: . . . versus Higginson case. Appearances of

All right. Thank you.
How are you, Your Honor? This is Evan

Schmutz on behalf of the defendants.
THE COURT:

Thank you. Nice to have all of you here.

16

I have received both of the motions for summary judgment that

17

have been filed. And after reviewing those, let me tell you how

18

I'd like to proceed. I'd like to hear from the plaintiff with

19

regard to their motion for summary judgment and I would like

20

you to argue not only your motion but the defenses and your

21

response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. And

22

then I'm going to hear from the defendant and give you a chance

23

to respond to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, as well

24

as pursuing the issues that you've raised by way of summary

25

judgment. So on that basis, Mr. Allred, let me hear from you
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
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1

first with regard to the issues.

2

MR. ALLRED:

3

So the issues are actually pretty simple. The facts

Thank you, Your Honor.

4

are very simple. There's been a few kind of academic legal

5

arguments thrown in, but the prima facie case is there and it's

6

undisputed. Both parties agree that Mr. Morton gave Mr.

7

Higginson $491,000. Both parties agree that Mr. Higginson

8

executed the (inaudible) note, saying that he would repay

9:

$491,000 plus five percent interest upon demand. And both

10
11

parties agree that Mr. Higginson has not paid.
THE COURT:

Weren't they conditioned on the notion

12

that Mr. Morton was going to have--or that Mr. Higginson was

13

going to sell his stock and that there was going to be a

14

windfall and that he would have sufficient resources to pay

15

that back? And there were representations that he didn't need

16

to pay it back unless those conditions took place.

17

MR. ALLRED:

So Mr. Higginson has argued that. That

18

was new to us, that that is now the theory that he's proceeding

19

under. He's proceeded under a few different theories in the

20

past few years. So that theory ca.me up in one of his briefs.

21

The problem with that theory is that it's not in the demand

22

note. The demand note has an integration clause saying that

23

it's the entirety of the agreement. So some alleged side

24

agreement that there is no payment required unless Mr.

25

Higginson is able to recover one hundred times the amount he's
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1

owed has no basis in the agreement. There's also no basis in

2

any contemporaneous evidence. There's been emails provided to

3

the Court that Mr. Higginson has authenticated. He agrees that

4

they were exchanged. There's no indication in those emails that

5

there was any contingency. The time line doesn't support any

6

contingency, but that has been brought up.

7

So we provided the Court with the case of Fengren

8

that I think is pretty directly on point. There's a lease in

9

that case where one party wants to say that there was a

10

condition present, a side oral argument, before the lease could

11

be enforced. The trial court went along with the side oral

12

agreement and the appellate court and the Supreme Court

13

reversed and said if there is an integration clause in the

14

agreement and if the agreement is unambiguous, then you don't

15

get to introduce (inaudible) evidence.

16

So Mr. Higginson is not allowed and the Court cannot

17

consider any claim that there was some oral side agreement

18

years ago that has no record anywhere, other than Mr. Higginson

19

raising it now.

vJ

20

THE COURT:

So you're suggesting that it has to be in

21

writing and modify the demand note for it to be effective, for

22

the Court to take notice of that?

23

MR. ALLRED:

24

THE COURT:

25

Under the integration clause, yes.
What about the presentment theory that

you have not presented the original note and we have all these
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1

contingencies? I didn't see them necessarily supported by a

2

factual basis. But the note may have been negotiated or

3

transferred or something bad happened to it. Where are we with

4

regard to that issue?

5

MR. ALLRED:

6

So that's another interesting argument.

So in Mr. Higginson's original opposition, he says that the

1j

Court cannot enforce the agreement because we haven't presented

t
I

8!

the original and what if Mr. Morton negotiated the note to some

9

third party and now Mr. Higginson is at risk of someone to come

10

and collect later? Mr. Higginson signs a declaration, testifies

11

that he never gave Mr. Morton the original. So why there was a

12

concern about some third party negotiation is a little unclear

13

to me. But the presentment issue I think is no longer an issue.

14

Originally, we thought we had the original. Now Mr. Higginson

15

has testified that he never gave Mr. Morton the original. So we

16

don't have one.

17

So if--so there's a couple of ways to address that

18

issue. Either there was constructive issuance of the note, when

19

he gave a scanned copy of and (inaudible)--because it's kind of

20

an obscure idea. So either there was constructive issuance, in

21

which case constructive presentment would be the mirror image

22

of that and that would satisfy presentment. Otherwise, Mr.

23

Higginson would be able to issue--constructively issue notes

24

and then avoid repayment by requiring originals in return she

25

never provided. So that can't be the answer.
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1

Since the briefings, the idea that's appealing to me

2

more and more is that if there was no issuance, as Mr.

3

Higginson has testified, then this may not be a UCC 3 case

4

because it doesn't satisfy the UCC 3 requirements. And Mr.

5

Higginson wants to argue that if it's not UCC 3, then he's

6

found a loophole to some law where he's allowed to sign the

7

document, receive $500,000, and walk away. Obviously that can't

8

be the case.

9

If it's not a UCC theory case, then you have just a

10

contract. It would be the same as if someone was required to

11

pay ten percent of gross receipts to a landlord. Then it's not

12

a sum certain in the contract, so it can't be a negotiable

13

instrument, but it's still an enforceable contract. So here, if

14

it's not a negotiable instrument because it was never issued,

15

that's fine. It falls into just regular contract. You have a

16

signed document. You have performance by Mr. Morton. You have

17

breach by Mr. Higginson. And you have damages. All uncontested.

18

So where the Court lands on that legal issue of

19

whether it wants to allow constructive issuance and

20

constructive presentment, again, is kind of academically

21

interesting but it doesn't change the outcome. One way or the

22

other, Mr. Higginson has to repay the five hundred- sorry,

23

$491,000 that he received.

24
25

The only other real--there's been a few objections
raised by Mr. Higginson, some of which fell out in later
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
801-285-9495 / thackertranscripts@gmail.com
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00522

~

Motions for Summary Judgment - November 19, 2015
8

1

briefing, like contesting whether he paid and then admitting he

2

didn't pay or contesting whether Mr. Morton died and then

3

admitting that Mr. Morton died. Once those are dealt with, the

4

only other real substantive argument that he's made to the

5

prima facie breach of contract case--which is I think where
I

61 this case belongs; it should be a breach of contract case--it's
i

71

to say that somehow Ms. Carmichael does not have firsthand

8

knowledge and is not able to present the evidence in a

9

sufficient way to the Court.

10

We provided the Court with case law showing that the

11

Court is not--well, there's actually a few responses to that.

12

First, Ms. Carmichael is testifying as the personal

13

representative of the estate, and the Court is allowed to

14

consider that as authenticating documents. If that weren't the

15

case, then any time someone died all of the decedent's debtors

16

would be off scot free because there would be no one there to

17

present the case. Obviously the law is not that weak.

18

Decedent's estates can go forward and present claims. So that

19

argument I don't find particularly persuasive.

20

In addition, we provided the Court with case law

21

showing that the Court can consider all of the evidence in

22

front of it, even the evidence provided by Mr. Higginson. So if

23

the Court says Ms. Carmichael's authentication of emails or

24

demand notes is insufficient, Mr. Higginson authenticated them

25

himself. So the Court shouldn't be worried that the documents
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1

are not what they attest to be because both parties agree that

2

they are.

3

I think that addresses the breach of contract issues.

4

Which, again, I think this case is an incredibly simple breach

5

of contract case.

6
vA

On the other issues, the equitable issues, Mr.

7

Higginson has argued two main points. One is the economic loss

8

rule, where if there's a contract then you can't bring a claim

9

in equity. And the second is statute of limitations. On the

10

economic loss rule, I think--! agree with Mr. Higginson on the

11

legal point, that if there is an enforceable contract that you

12

can't pursue a claim of equity.

13

But, as the case law we provided indicates, the

14

economic loss rule only comes into play if the Court has found

15

that there is an enforceable contract. If the Court finds an

16

enforceable contract, great, we resolve this as breach of

17

contract like we should. But if somehow Mr. Higginson is able

18

to convince the Court that through some unknown loophole this

19

is not a contract, then we fall into equity and the Court is

20

able to consider the fact that Mr. Morton gave Mr. Higginson

21

$491,000 and Mr. Higginson has refused to repay. So the

22

economic loss rule I don't think really resolves anything. The

23

question really is whether we have an enforceable contract.

24
25

The final issue that Mr. Higginson has raised is
statute of limitations. And, again, I have a fundamental
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1

disagreement with the way he portrays statues of limitations.

2

Statutes of limitations. In order for a statute of limitations

3

to trigger, for the clock to start ticking, there has to be

4

some harm that would cause a plaintiff to bring a cause of

5

action. So Mr. Higginson argues in his brief that the clock

6

started ticking either in 2006 or 2008. I don't know how that

7

could be, if in 2008, Mr. Higginson responds to an email where

8

Mr. Morton says remember that $500,000 you owe me? Let's get a

9

demand note so that we can get it in writing. And Mr. Higginson

10

says in response, "Yes, we'll get a demand note so that even if

11

I, Mr. Higginson, get run over by a bus, you will still be

12

paid." And then executes a demand notes and sends a scanned

13

copy to Mr. Morton. There is no reason that Mr. Morton would

14

then run to the court to sue Mr. Higginson. There is no claim.

15

Nothing is (inaudible). There is no reason for the statute of

16

limitations to start.

17

Instead, the statute of limitations, under any

18

theory, starts when Mr. Higginson breaches or does some harm to

19

Mr. Morton. And that only happens when he says, No, I'm not

20

going to pay you. So you have the note in 2008. Mr. Morton dies

21

in 2009. The estate contacts Mr. Higginson. They start talking.

22

There's a little bit of a dispute over how these conversations

23

go, though I don't think it's material. Mr. Higginson and the

24

estate start talking and Mr. Higginson says, I'll repay you but

25

I need to wait until this Deep Creek legislation--litigation
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1

goes away and I need to wait until something happens with my

2

stock shares. So the estate holds off. Which is fine. They're

3

allowed to do that under the demand note. So they're waiting.

4

Still fine. There's no reason for them to run to the court.

5

Then, after all of those stall issues go away, the estate comes

6

to Mr. Higginson and says, Okay, pay up. And he, at that point,

7

says no. Flat no, you're not getting a cent out of me. That's

8

where you have breach. That's where you have harm. That's where

9

you have unjust retention of the benefit. And at that point,

vo

10

the clock starts ticking. That was in 2014. So we're well

11

within the statute of limitations on any cause of action we

12

brought.

13
14
15

THE

COURT:

Are there issues of material fact with

regard to that that the Court needs to defer to?

MR. ALLRED:

There is a·dispute as to how the

16

conversations went between the estate and Mr. Higginson, but I

17

don't believe those change any of the analysis. You're still

18

within the statute of limitations because there hasn't been a

19

time where he says no I don't owe you any money, I'm not going

20

to repay anything. That is outside of the statute of

21

limitations.

22
23

THE COURT:

Under 2014? That's when he says no I'm

not going to pay?

24

MR. ALLRED:

25

THE COURT:

Correct.
Is that with your reading of this?
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1

MR. ALLRED:

2

THE COURT:

Yes.
And there may be a disagreement as to

3

dates, specific dates and times, but well within the statute of

4

limitations period for a contract claim?

5

MR. ALLRED:

To be candid, I'm not really sure

6

exactly when Mr. Higginson says he was never going to repay.

7

His most recent brief says from the get-go he was never going

8

to repay, which doesn't jive with executing a demand note and

9

responding to emails in 2008. So I don't know when he claims

10

that he said I'm not going to pay. But the gist of all of it is

11

you have an uncontested, straightforward exchange of money with

12

a written demand note. And Mr. Higginson should not be allowed

13

to say Mr. Morton's dead so now the money's mine. That's not

14

just. That's not what the law requires. Thank you.

15'

THE COURT:

Thank you. Mr. Schmutz--

16

MR. SCHMUTZ:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SCHMUTZ:

19

Your Honor, the facts in this case are in dispute and

Thank you, Your Honor.
--let me get your input as well.
Okay. Thank you.

20

there are material genuine issues of fact that are in dispute.

21

There is also some legal issues that compel the Court's

22

granting of our summary judgment motion. I'll begin with his

23

summary judgment motion.

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. SCHMUTZ:

Okay.
Your Honor, the facts have been
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1

presented by Mr. Higginson and have not been rebutted, that the

2

obligation that is at issue in this case, was--arose in 2006

3

when Mr. Morton transmitted $491,000 to Mr. Higginson. We don't

4

dispute that that transfer was made. But we do--we have

5

presented facts that the basis of that transfer was a transfer

6

between two friends, one of whom, the decedent, was the

7

attorney of Mr. Higginson and had long been his attorney and

8

certainly was endowed with the capability to understand the

9

legal basis upon which things happened. He readily transmitted

10

$491,000 to Mr. Higginson to assist Mr. Higginson in a time of

11

need. Mr. Higginson has also presented evidence that prior

12

thereto Mr. Higginson had provided between five and ten million

13

dollars to Mr. Morton without any consideration back on Mr.

14

Morton. He served briefly and ineffectively as a board of

15

director's member. Mr. Higginson arranged for that. Mr.

16

Higginson arranged for him to receive stock. And Mr. Morton

17

felt indebted to Mr. Higginson.

18

So Mr. Morton agreed to send the $491,000. There was

~

19

no written instrument that surrounded that transaction at the

20

time. There was, however, an understanding between the parties.

21

The understanding was that the transfer of money would be a

22

loan, which would be repaid upon condition that the stock that

23

Mr. Higginson still held in (inaudible) corporation could be

24

sold. Because it was restricted in his hands. And upon the sale

25

of that stock, he would pay Mr. Morton back for the $491,000.
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1

That was the understanding. And that's been set forth in this

2

record.

3

What happened is two years later--

4

THE COURT:

And when you say that, you say it as a

5

matter of fact, when--and I look at the demand note. And the

6

demand note's devoid of any contingency with regard to that. It

7

seems to be an integrated instrument, as far as I can tell. And

8

I don't have the invitation to look to parol evidence to find

9

those things out that you've described. And I don't doubt that

10

they've taken place. Mr. Morton's not here to rebut those. But,

11

you know, that's the record I've got in front of me. But the

12

troubling part is, I don't see them as part of the demand note.
MR. SCHMUTZ:

13

14

Yes, but--let me address that, Your

Honor.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SCHMUTZ:

17

Okay.
Thank you for that question. So we

march forward over two years.

18,

THE COURT:

19

MR. SCHMUTZ:

Right.
And then about two years later--and let

20

me first address the belittling remarks that counsel has made

21

with respect to some perceived shifting of opinion. Our

22

objections in this case, originally filed in response to

23

counsel's presentation of a motion for summary, were based upon

24

the fact that counsel failed to produce any evidence whatsoever

2slI in the filing of his motion. We made the objection at that
I
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1

point on that record. And later on, we permitted him to correct

2

egregious errors, to put into evidence the documents that he

3

had referred to but had never filed. As a consequence of that,

4

we shifted because we no longer had that situation, having

5

permitted him to do that by stipulation.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SCHMUTZ:

Right.
Our continuing objection is that Ms.

8

Carmichael's declaration, though sufficient to put evidence

9

into the record in terms of documents found in a file

10

contained, is not based on any personal knowledge whatsoever

11

about what the nature of those communications were, what was

12

said, who said it, and whether they were in fact written by

13

anyone in particular. All she can do is say these documents

14

were sitting in this file and here they are. So we have not

15

shifted theories on that. We've simply permitted counsel to

16

correct his egregious mistakes.

17

Now, we come back to the year 2008, December, 2008,

18

and a note is put into place. The basis for the note, as we

19

have described--and I would like to have the Court's indulgence

20

to allow me to describe the facts and then explain why parol

21

evidence does not prevent the Court from considering them.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. SCHMUTZ:

All right.
The facts are that mister--as the

24

emails show, Mr. Morton inquired and said--inquired to someone

25

other than Kraig Higginson but who was associated with him and
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1

said would you talk to Kraig? It's a little awkward for me to

2

talk to him, we're old friends, and ask him what the status is

3

of the money that I lent him. And Higginson gets back to him

4

and say, in one of his emails, I'm thinking that it's looking

5:

good that we may be able to sell this stock and pay you back,

6

which is fully consistent with Mr. Higginson's declaration. So

7

Mr. Higginson testifies that this agreement at all times was

8!

that he pay him back on the condition that he was able to sell.

9·

These old friends had accounts towards one and another.

10

Then a circumstance arose that Mr. Morton said I need

11

to have a note for a specific and special purpose. I need to

12

have an instrument or a document in my files that if I get

13

audited by the IRS it is not going to show that I have given a

14

gift and I get taxed on the gift. I need a document to suggest

15

that there is a debt outstanding so I don't get taxed. That was

16

the specific purpose for this. Now that purpose, as it was,

17

would beg the fact that the note wouldn't explain the purpose,

18

which was apparently to make a presentation to the IRS. So the

19

parties--so Kraig agreed to sign the note.

20

~.nd then a couple of very important things happened.

21

Kraig withheld the original; did not deliver the original

22

signatures on the note, giving him only a copy. That copy was

23

held by him and no demand was made during his lifetime on it.

24

Again consistent.

25

!

So with respect to parol evidence, we are not
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1

intending to vary through any parol evidence the language that

2

is written on the note. But we are intending to explain that

3

the purpose and intent of the parties was not to treat that

4

instrument as a demand upon which an obligation was required to

5

be performed.

THE COURT:

6
vJ

And does it matter if--and I don't know

7

that the Court's compelled to make that finding, but if in fact

8

this were done and you had a note and the note established an

9

obligation and you told me really the only reason I want this

10

note is because I want to be able to address Revenue Service

11

and make sure they don't--aren't I at risk by having a note

12

that's fully integrated, that's out there? Hadn't I ought to

13

put in that note that to conform with section such and such of

14

the IRS code note's here and that I can explain that in the

15

original document?

MR. SCHMUTZ:

16

No, Your Honor, I don't believe so. For

17

a couple of reasons. One, that would defeat the specific

18

purpose for which Mr. Morton requested the note.

19

THE

COURT:

Well, it would verify it. It would show

20

that there was an obligation there and that--you could even

21

draft the contingency into it; that it shouldn't be paid or

22

need to be paid- -

23

MR. SCHMUTZ:

24

THE COURT:

25

Well---{inaudible) sold, or whatever the

other.
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I

11

MR. SCHMUTZ:

I understand that. I turn again then to

!

2

the code, Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-

3

105.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. SCHMUTZ:

Yeah.
The language of this code, subsection

6

two, says "an unissued instrument or an unissued incomplete

7

instrument." This was never issued. A copy was given. "That is

8

completed is binding on the maker or drawer." But non-issua..T1ce

9

is a defense. And then this language is particularly applicable

10

to your question. "An instrument that is conditionally issued

11

or is issued for a special purpose as binding on the maker is

12

binding on the maker or drawer. But failure of the condition or

13

special purpose to be fulfilled is a defense.

14

right to demonstrate that this was--that this note was issued

15

on a special--for a special purpose and on condition. And that

16

condition was that it would only be paid back if the stock in

17

(inaudible) was sold, if Kraig's stock in (inaudible) could be

18:

sold.

11

We have the

19

And the particular purpose was not to create a demand

20

note that would be enforceable on its terms. Rather, to present

211

a document in a file that would show to the IRS that this was

22:

not a gift. So with respect to the parol evidence rule, we have

23!

the right to raise that defense. We have the right to show the

24

specific purpose. And we have the right to show the condition

25

for which--and upon which this was issued.
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1

It is also telling that this demand is drafted almost

2

three years after the agreement upon which the obligation was

3

founded. The demand note refers to the obligation. And I think

4

it is also a factual--in factual dispute the nature and

5

controlling purpose of that obligation.

6

So we believe, Your Honor, that with respect with the

7

question of parol evidence, we are entitled, not to add

8

language or change language, but to show the Court what the

9

parties understood, agreed to, and for which purpose this note

10

was put into place. There was never an indication during the

11

lifetime of Mr. Morton that he considered it any different than

12

that. In fact, he said at one point in one of his emails that

13

the conditions to be described are whatever would be back, he'd

14

rely on Mr. Higginson for that. So we believe that this note

15

can be explained as to special purpose and condition under Utah

16

code by parol evidence to describe the parties' discussions

17

about why this was put into place.

18

So in that respect, Your Honor, the facts in this

19

case are in dispute on a material issue and summary judgment

20

cannot lie on--plaintiff's summary judgment. Moreover, Your

21

Honor, the legal issues of failure to present an original on

22

demand and non-issuance of this instrument as an original

23

instrument are both legal barriers to the granting of any

24

summary judgment to the defendant in this case. There's been

25

some law- THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
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i

11

THE COURT:

2

MR. SCHMUTZ:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. SCHMUTZ:

And that's the UCC law that you-Yes, Your Honor.
The Article 3?
And our case law does specifically rely

5

upon a referred Article 3. The lone case that defendant has--

6

that plaintiff has presented, the Wells Fargo case, is a case

7

where there was really no record. But what does appear to come

8

out of it is it arises in the context of a non-judicial

9

foreclosure of land on a trust deed with an accompanying note.

10

In that circumstance it's very much different than what we're

11

dealing with here in that a note is recorded. A note is

12

recorded, signed and makes direct reference--excuse me, not a

13

note. A trust deed. A trust deed is recorded. It's signed and
recorded and makes direct reference to assert the existence of
the note. And so that is much different than the facts and

16
17

circumstances that we have here.
The case law that we have prevented--yes, we do raise

18

hypothetical questions. We don't raise those hypothetical

19

questions to suggest to the Court that we have any specific

20

evidence to show that there's been an effort on the part of the

21

plaintiff to present this for payment elsewhere, to negotiate

22

it. We present it because that's the law. And the law is

23

explained as being necessitated in order to avoid such

24

instances. But it doesn't--it isn't--the law doesn't turn on

25

whether or not those factual circumstances exist in a
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1

particular case. It simply provides the connnon law basis upon

2

which Article 3 was enacted and upon which case law continues

3

to require presentment.

4

'--'

Then we turn specifically to section 105 of Chapter

5

3, Title 70A, and that specifically requires that the note

6

itself be issued. And it hasn't been issued. And it wasn't

7

issued for the purposes that are described in Mr. Higginson's

8

note. The purpose of this note was to take a place in a file to

9

provide a defense against an IRS audit as to whether there

10

should be a gift tax that would be applied. So both legally

11

and--there are factual issues that this Court must determine at

12

a trial of this action. And there are legal issues that prevent

13

the motion for summary judgment from being granted.

14

With respect to our motion, Your Honor, those same

15

legal issues compel the motion, our motion, to (inaudible). In

16

the absence of the ability to present the original. And, in

17

fact, with unrebutted evidence that there was no original ever

18

delivered or issued, then this Court must grant our motion that

19

this note, though perhaps an enforceable document, the

20

conditions have not been satisfied for it.

~

21

Now, with respect to whether we take the position

22

that it's an enforceable agreement in terms of whether

23

equitable theories could be presented, we're speaking

24

alternatively because we don't know how the Court is going to

25

rule. But if this is an enforceable document, then no equitable
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1

theories can move forward and must be denied. And the only

2

position taken by the plaintiff is that it is an enforceable

3

document, enforceable contract. Based upon their theory, which

4

is not alternative, but based upon their theory that this is

5

enforceable, then the equitable provisions must die.

6

But let's look at say what if the Court determined

7

that the note itself was not an enforceable instrument. Not an

8

enforceable contract, excuse me. And that, in fact, equitable

9

theories could take its place of promissory estoppel and unjust

10

11

enrichment.
Then we turn to the statute of limitations. I find,

12

frankly, find the argument on statute of limitations to be

13

outrageous. The suggestion would be that you can have a theory

14

of promissory estoppel or unjust enrichment following the time

15

that the party is enriched and wait for an untold and unlimited
number of years, until you decide or your estate decides
following your death to try to make a claim on such an

18

equitable theory. With no statute of limitations, that would in

19

fact remove the statute of limitations until the claimant or

20

the plaintiff determines that he wants to proceed. That's just

21

untenable. Twenty five years later some heir decides that

22

there's an unjust enrichment that occurred and because no

23

demand was ever made you can assert a claim without concern

24

over being barred by a statute of limitations. That is the

25

theory that is being presented.
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1

There is no doubt in the emails that have been

2

presented that Mr. Morton queried are you going to pay me that

3

money and what's going on with that? He was well aware of his

4

rights. He was well aware and made in fact a demand, although

5

he recognized the condition, but he indicated that within two

6

years after the money had--three years after the money had been

7

transmitted, the unjust enrichment alleged had been made. So if

8

this contract is not enforceable and it would allow equitable

9

claims to be asserted, then the statute of limitations has to

10

run. The equitable claims are eight years old by the time this

11

case is filed, from 2006 to 2014. I think it's eight years and

12

five months or something like that. So I just cannot see how

13

there can be essentially no statute of limitations that is

14

applied to this case.

15

As a consequence of that, in our view, Your Honor,

16

you must either eliminate the promissory estoppel and unjust

17

enrichment claims, as well as the fraud claim and the

18

conversion claims, neither of which have been even argued in

19

opposition to our motion. But you'd have to eliminate those

20

claims on the basis of the existence of the contract, if the

21

Court determines in the first scenario that this contract is

22

going to be an enforceable document. Then the Court would have

23

to analyze the questions of disputed fact that exist as to its

24

enforceability. But if it's enforceable, all equitable

25

principles die. All equitable claims cannot proceed. If it is
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1

unenforceable, the statute of limitations bars the equitable

2

claim. The only claim that could survive a statute of

3

limitations argument--excuse me, bar--is the written contract,

4

and that was filed admittedly five years and ten months, just

5

1

prior to the running of the statute of limitations. We believe

6

that the Court must apply the statute of limitations to this

7

case and must determine whether equitable principles can even

8

be asserted.

9

Your Honor, we believe that the arguments that are

10

made here simply do not change the facts. It is interesting to

11

me that counsel's entire argument seemed premised on a

12

presumption that his deceased client did not enter into the

13

arrangements that Mr. Higginson describes. But he ignores the

14

facts in making that assumption. He simply pretends that no

15

such arrangement was made. And in fact, the facts say that it

16

was. So if they're in dispute we need to hear those questions

17

of dispute.

18

In summary, we contend that under Utah Code ?0A-3-105

19

we have the right to raise the defense of special purpose and

20

raise the defense of special condition, and we are doing that

21

through the affidavit or declaration of Mr. Higginson. Second--

22

and that does, in our view, overcome the parol evidence; that

23

the Court can hear it for that purpose. Not for the purpose of

24

trying to vary the instrument, but for the purpose of providing

25

the defense. The special purpose and condition.
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Secondly, Your Honor, as stated, we believe that the

2

contract itself eviscerates the equitable remedies. We believe

3

that fraud has not been opposed. Our motion should stand

4

without opposition. We believe that the claim of conversion has

5

not been opposed. Our motion should stand. But in either event,

6

the statute of limitations eliminates the two of them. No

7

argument has been made to the contrary. And we believe that we

8

should go forward on whether or not the note has been--the

9

conditions of the note have been satisfied. We contend that

10

they have not. And we believe that's the issue that can be

11

determined by the Court. Does the Court have any further

12

questions for me?
THE COURT:

13

14

that.

15

MR. SCHMUTZ:

16

THE COURT:

17
18

No, and I appreciate your assistance on

Thank you.
Thank you. Mr. Allred, let me get your

rebuttal.
MR. ALLRED:

Thank you, Your Honor. So in response to

19

what is a very simple case with a written document--an

20

unambiguous, four corners document--Mr. Higginson is bringing

21

in a lot of extraneous information, which, if we haven't

22

directly rebutted it, it's because it's irrelevant. So, for

23

example, he talks about legal services that Mr. Morton provided

24

to Mr. Higginson and some apparent payment through stock. I

25

don't know whether that happened or not. And I didn't look into
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it because it's not relevant to the issue at hand. If the Court

21

wants to open up that box, then we would have to get into

3: whether the payment in stock was reimbursement for services or
4

some other amount and whether Mr. Morton had provided five

I

million dollars of services and how much was recovered and was

5:
i
I

6:

it on contingency. It's a whole world of issues that are just

7

not relevant here. We have a contract, and they've admitted all

8

of the important issues, so we don't need to go in the weeds on

9i
1

i

unimP_ ortant issues.

10!

I was interested by the argument that this was--the

11

note was given as some sort of collusive attempt at tax fraud

12

in 2008. I'm surprised by that argument. We dispute that Mr.

13

Morton was committing tax fraud in 2008 and that Mr. Higginson

14i

assisted in tax fraud in 2008. I don't think--again, I think

15

that's outside of the issues of a four corners unambiguous

16

document. You enforce it as it's written.

17

Mister--counsel also indicated that there's nothing

18

in this case indicating by Mr. Morton when he was alive that he
!

19

expected repayment and somehow he interprets emails of Mr.

20

Morton saying hey what about that $500,000 you owe me? Hey, can

21

we get this in demand note, I want it written. Mr. Higginson

22

saying yes I'll sign it so that even if I get hit by a bus you

23

will get paid. I haven't forgotten what I owe you. Interprets

24

those emails as not--something other than an indication by Mr.

25

Morton that yeah he expected to get paid. And after the money
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1

was given, a few years later, he is still expecting to get

2

paid. And his estate, whatever knowledge transfer happened in

3

the estate, was under the impression that they were going to

4

get paid. So the only person arguing that this wasn't what it

5

appears to be was the person that owes the money. And he's

6

doing it without any contemporaneous evidence years later to

7

avoid repayment, which is not surprising but is not supported

8

by any of the evidence. An email from a living person saying

9

when are you going to pay me my money is definitely an

10

indication that he expected to get repaid, not that it was some

11

sort of tax fraud.

12

vJ

With regard to--counsel made mention of case law

13

regarding UCC 3 and characterized the Wells Fargo case. I'll

14

admit that that's a mortgage case. It's a show me the note

15

theory that this jurisdiction and most jurisdictions have

16

rejected. I disagree with opposing counsel that the cases they

17

provided on UCC 5 are more persuasive than the case law on UCC

18

3. UCC 5 is letters of credit. We're not arguing letters of

19

credit. We're also not arguing negotiable instruments. So we're

20

not citing UCC 9. We cite UCC 3 because that's what's in front

21

of us if the Court finds that this is a UCC 3 case. Which,

22

again, given Mr. Higginson's statement that he never gave the

23

original, this may not be. It may just be a breach of contract

24

case.

25

Which brings me to another point. Counsel indicated
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1

that this may be an enforceable document. So the way I'm

2

reading their argument is they are arguing it is not a note

3

under UCC 3 because it was never issued or it was issued for a

4

special purpose and that all of the equitable claims have to be

5

removed because there's an enforceable contract. So if it's not

6

a note and it's still an enforceable contract in order to kill

7

all the equity claims, then we just have breach of contract.

8

And I agree, it's a straightforward breach of contract case.

9'

Four corners document.

10

On a final point--actually, two more points. Counsel

11

stated that his arguments with conversion and fraud are

12

unopposed. I disagree. We argued in our brief that the statute

13

of limitations does not start on those until the final harm has

14

happened. That's when the action accrues. We also argued

15

equitable tolling. If in this case Mr. Higginson provided the

16

document, that gives--provided a scan of the document to Mr.

17

Morton. That gives Mr. Morton the indication that everything is

18

going as it should be. There's no reason for him to sue Mr.

19

Higginson. So under equitable tolling, the statute of

20

limitations doesn't start until he's given a reason to come to

21

court.

22

Which brings me to the final point, where counsel

23

indicated that he finds it absurd that there would not be a

24

statute of limitations on equitable arguments until harm has

25

been done. I don't find that absurd. I work in the mortgage
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1

industry a lot. So in the mortgage industry we all know written

2

contracts have a statute of limitations of six years. In the

3

mortgage industry you have a 30 year note. Very often there's a

4

balloon payment at the end of the 30 year note. The only way

5

that there is a breach and that six year statute of limitation

6

period starts is if that balloon payment is not paid, if the

7

borrower doesn't pay. So in the mortgage field, it is very

8

common. It would be very common for a case to be brought 31

9

years after the note was entered into because the breach would

10

have happened at the end of a 30 year note when the balloon

11

payment wasn't made. So, yes, the law allows long periods of

12

time before a claim can be brought. Because the claim--the

13

clock doesn't start to run until harm is done.

14

There is--there are some states on demand notes that

15

impose statutory statute of limitations, that say if there's a

16

demand note you have to move to collect within eight years.

17

Utah doesn't have that statute. So in Utah, the demand note

18

life, forever, until it's demanded upon and the borrower

19

decides not to pay and that's when the clock starts.

v;J

20

So, again, no matter which theory we're under we

21

still have a situation where Mr. Higginson received $500,000,

22

signed a note, and has refused to pay. The material issues are

23

not in dispute.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. SCHMUTZ:

Thank you.
May I respond briefly, Your Honor?
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1

THE COURT:

You may. I want to give you a chance. You

2

had the--you were the moving party, Mr. Schmutz, with regard to

3

your motion and I want to give you a chance to respond on that

4

basis.
MR. SCHMUTZ:

5

Thank you, Your Honor. Counsel's

6

argument is if I didn't rebut it, it's not irrelevant--I mean

7

it's irrelevant. I think the Court can determine if something

8

wasn't rebutted whether it was relevant. ~.nd it stands

9

unrebutted. There are many factual statements that I have put

10

into this record that have not been rebutted. They are

11

relevant.

12

Counsel indicates that we've apparently made an

13

accusation of tax fraud. He says he disputes that. On what

14

record? Where's a record that he disputes? He has no

15

entitlement or power to dispute a fact that we've put into the

16

record. Secondly, Mr. Higginson--next, Mr. Higginson's

17

statements stand. It is almost entirely unrebutted. Thirdly,

18

the estate waited five and a half years after his death, after

19

Mr. Morton's death, to assert this action. Five and a half

20

years after he died. The statute of limitations is applicable

21

here.

22

I dispute the statement that no mortgage--that a

23

mortgage statute of limitation can go on for 30 years, whenever

24

they want to make a demand. In fact, the law requires that the

25

statute of limitations runs from the last date of payment. And
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when there's been a failure to pay under a mortgage, it's the

2

last date of payment. Now it is true that it can run many years

3

because payments are being made.
COURT:

4

THE

5

MR. SCHMUTZ:

Right.
But when payments cease, the statute

6

begins to run. I fully dispute his statement of law. Counsel

7

has not attempted in our oral argument or written argument to

8

rebut the clear law of Utah ?OA-3-105. He has not attempted to

9

rebut it. That law stands. There was no instrument issued in

10

this case and there are specific--a special purpose and

11

specific conditions that we have the right to raise in a

12

defense. I also dispute the fact--his characterization of our

13

argument. We are not arguing that this is not a note under UCC

14

3. We are arguing it is controlled by UCC 3 but it is defective

15

under UCC 3.

16

Now, let me conclude with some effort on the part of

17

counsel to suggest to the Court that he has in fact argued in

18

opposition to our motion for summary judgment on the fraud and

19

conversion claims. Your Honor, you can look at his memorandum

20

in opposition. You won't find a mention of it. What you will

21

find with respect to the statute of limitations and the tolling

22

argument that he has made, that it is under the heading C, the

23

estate's equitable claims are not barred by the statute of

24

limitations. Conversion and fraud are not equitable claims.

25

He's completely failed to respond in any way to rebut our very
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11

clean and simple argument that he's waited about five years too

2

long to assert a fraud claim and about four years too long to

3

assert a conversion claim.

4

Do you have any further questions for me, Your Honor?

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. SCHMUTZ:

7

THE COURT:

No. Thank you.
Thank you.
Thanks, counsel. Let me say at the

8

outset, counsel, I appreciate your preparation and the work

9:

that both sides have done. It appears as if the parties have

10

worked to address this situation, rather than simply deal with

11

issues of {inaudible) in all of these matters. The good

12

lawyering, I think, makes the Court look closely with regard to

13

the options and what should or shouldn't happen under these

14

circumstances.

15

Based upon the Court's review and the oral argument

16

that I've heard today, I'm convinced that the grant of the

17

motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff is

1al

appropriate at this juncture and I'm denying the--

19

simultaneously denying the defendant's motion for summary

20

judgment and finding that the basis of that is a contract claim

I'

21

i

and that it's supported by the demand note of 2008 in the

I

22

23

j

amount of $491,000 with an interest rate of five percent
annually, and that that note supported a tender of funds just
short of $500,000 in 2006. And I think those facts are
uncontroverted with regard to the actual matter. The Court
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1

further finds that a representative for the Morton estate sent

2

the defendant a demand letter on September 5 of 2014 that Mr.

3

Higginson failed to pay--failed to respond or pay that amount.

4

The crux of the Court's ruling is that there is no

5

evidence in the demand note that there were conditions that

6

were predicated, that were established that provided a defense

7

or a basis for that. I find that there is an integrated note,

8

that it's the entire agreement between the parties, that it

9

would be inappropriate for the Court to receive parol evidence

10

regarding the theories that have been raised by defense counsel

11

and I believe that the conditions are stated there. I'm finding

12

that the defendant admits that there was a tender of funds just

13

short of $500,000; that the defendant, Mr. Higginson, did in

14

fact execute the demand note; and that Mr. Higginson did not

15

repay the note either. The Court finds that there's an

16

enforceable contract, that it's a contract case, that the

17

emails authenticate the demand note.

18

I don't reach the issues of the equity contract

19

claims based upon the fact that the Court is prepared to grant

20

summary judgment on the contract claim. I'm not finding that

21

the requirements of UCC 3 are imposed but I do find that there

22

is substantial compliance with those, even assuming they were

23

applicable. I'm not finding that the statute of limitations has

24

run with regard to the contract claim and that the Court

25

doesn't reach the statute of limitations issues with regard to
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1

the equitable claims simply because there is a basis there. I

2'

don't find that the defendant's raising of hypothetical

3

questions concerning the funds are compelling or establish an

4

issue of material fact to preclude stmllilary judgment under those

5

circumstances.

6

I'm going to invite Mr. Allred, if you would, to

7

prepare an order with regard to the summary judgment case. I'd

8

like Mr. Schmutz to receive that and make sure it's consistent

9! with the Court's ruling before it's presented to the Court.
10

Based upon that, the Court's prepared to enter that order and

11

to proceed accordingly.

12

Thank you, counsel. I appreciate your assistance.

13

MR. ALLRED:

14

YrlE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.
The court's in recess.

(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED)

15
16

17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
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